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Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Sugiono, has issued a forceful call for the immediate finalization of a robust and effective Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, emphasizing that the region has waited far too long for a definitive framework to manage prevailing tensions. The urgent appeal was delivered during a plenary session at a recent ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) held in the Philippines, where Jakarta’s top diplomat underscored Indonesia’s unwavering commitment to resolving the contentious issue this year. Sugiono’s statement was a clear articulation of Indonesia’s long-held position that stability and predictability in the vital waterway must be anchored in international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, rather than unilateral power assertions.

The Urgent Call for a Binding Code of Conduct

Addressing his regional counterparts, Foreign Minister Sugiono not only welcomed the ongoing CoC negotiations but also pushed for an accelerated timeline. "Indonesia is committed to completing an effective and substantive Code of Conduct this year, one that is firmly rooted in international law, especially UNCLOS 1982," Sugiono stated, drawing a sharp distinction between a rules-based order and a power-based dynamic. He elaborated on this critical distinction, asserting, "Not just to meet a deadline, but because a region governed by rules will always be stronger than a region governed by power." This principle resonates deeply within ASEAN, an organization founded on consensus and multilateralism.

The Minister’s impassioned plea highlighted the protracted nature of the dispute, noting that the people of the region "should no longer have to wait too long for these rules to be completed." This sentiment echoes a widespread frustration among ASEAN member states and the broader international community regarding the slow pace of progress, with Sugiono pointing out that stakeholders have been waiting for a binding Code of Conduct for 24 years. This timeframe notably references the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) in 2002, a non-binding agreement that, despite its intentions, has failed to stem the rising tide of incidents and claims in the strategic waterway. The call for a rapid conclusion of the CoC negotiations reflects a growing urgency among several ASEAN nations, particularly those with direct territorial disputes with China, to establish a legally binding framework that can prevent further escalation and ensure regional stability.

A Deep Dive into the South China Sea Dispute

The South China Sea has long been a crucible of geopolitical tension, a complex web of overlapping territorial and maritime claims involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. At the heart of the dispute is China’s expansive "nine-dash line" claim, which encompasses roughly 90% of the South China Sea, including numerous islands, reefs, and shoals. These features, such as the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, and Macclesfield Bank, are claimed by Beijing as integral parts of its sovereign territory. However, these same features, or significant portions thereof, are also claimed by several Southeast Asian nations, leading to persistent friction and occasional confrontations.

The strategic importance of the South China Sea cannot be overstated. It is one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, with an estimated one-third of global maritime trade, valued at over $3 trillion annually, transiting its waters. Beneath its surface, vast reserves of oil and natural gas are believed to lie, alongside rich fishing grounds crucial for the livelihoods of millions in the region. The control of these resources and sea lanes holds immense economic and strategic value, making the dispute a flashpoint for regional and global powers.

International law, specifically UNCLOS 1982, forms the bedrock of most claimant states’ arguments against China’s historical claims. UNCLOS establishes a comprehensive legal framework for the world’s oceans and seas, defining maritime zones such as territorial waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and continental shelves. It provides a basis for states to assert sovereign rights over natural resources and jurisdiction over economic activities within their EEZs, which extend 200 nautical miles from their coastlines. China, while a signatory to UNCLOS, interprets its provisions differently and often asserts "historical rights" over the disputed areas, a stance widely contested by other claimants and the international community.

A pivotal moment in the legal landscape of the dispute occurred in July 2016, when an arbitral tribunal constituted under UNCLOS, in a case brought by the Philippines against China, overwhelmingly rejected China’s expansive claims based on the nine-dash line, finding them to have no legal basis under international law. The tribunal also ruled that certain features claimed by China were not islands but rocks or low-tide elevations, and therefore not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf. Despite the international legal victory for the Philippines, China vehemently rejected the ruling, declaring it "null and void" and refusing to recognize its legitimacy, further complicating efforts to resolve the dispute through legal avenues.

The Elusive Search for a Regional Framework: From DoC to CoC

The quest for a framework to manage the South China Sea dispute dates back decades. Early attempts to address the rising tensions saw the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in 1992, which called for peaceful resolution of disputes and self-restraint. This paved the way for the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), signed by ASEAN and China in Phnom Penh in November 2002.

The DoC was initially hailed as a breakthrough, a commitment by all parties to promote a peaceful and stable environment in the South China Sea. Its provisions included commitments to exercise self-restraint, refrain from actions that might complicate or escalate disputes, and explore cooperative activities. However, the DoC was explicitly non-binding and lacked an effective enforcement mechanism. Over the past two decades, its limitations have become glaringly apparent, with numerous incidents occurring that arguably violated its spirit, if not its specific provisions. The absence of a clear dispute resolution mechanism and the lack of consensus on its geographic scope rendered the DoC largely ineffective in preventing new escalations or promoting genuine confidence-building.

Recognizing the DoC’s shortcomings, ASEAN and China agreed in 2013 to commence formal consultations on a legally binding Code of Conduct. The objective was to move beyond the aspirational nature of the DoC towards a more concrete, enforceable instrument that would provide clear rules of engagement, prevent miscalculations, and establish mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution. After years of preliminary discussions and various rounds of negotiations, a framework for the CoC was finally adopted in August 2017 during the 50th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila, marking a significant, albeit incremental, step forward.

Since then, negotiations have continued, albeit at a slow pace. A Single Draft Negotiating Text (SDNT) was completed in 2018, serving as the basis for subsequent rounds of discussions. However, significant divergences persist, particularly concerning the CoC’s geographic scope (whether it should apply only to disputed features or the entire South China Sea), its legal nature (whether it should be legally binding and how disputes would be resolved), and the extent to which it would restrict or permit activities like military exercises or resource exploration with external partners. China has generally favored a CoC that focuses on confidence-building and crisis management rather than one that might constrain its maritime activities or challenge its sovereignty claims. The "24 years" mentioned by Minister Sugiono vividly underscores the glacial pace of progress since the DoC, highlighting the collective impatience for a more definitive resolution.

Indonesia’s Steadfast Advocacy for International Law

Indonesia, as the largest country in Southeast Asia and a non-claimant state in the core territorial disputes of the South China Sea (though its Natuna Islands’ Exclusive Economic Zone overlaps with China’s nine-dash line claim), has consistently positioned itself as an honest broker and a staunch advocate for a rules-based international order. Jakarta’s diplomatic efforts have long focused on promoting dialogue, de-escalation, and adherence to international law, particularly UNCLOS 1982.

Foreign Minister Sugiono’s emphasis on a CoC "firmly rooted in international law, especially UNCLOS 1982," is a reiteration of Indonesia’s core foreign policy principle concerning the South China Sea. Indonesia’s own maritime boundaries are defined by UNCLOS, and it has actively protested China’s incursions into its Natuna EEZ, asserting its sovereign rights over these waters and their resources. This experience reinforces Jakarta’s conviction that only a clear, legally binding framework based on UNCLOS can provide lasting stability.

Indonesia has historically played a crucial role in facilitating informal dialogues and workshops on the South China Sea, bringing together experts and officials from claimant states and China to explore avenues for cooperation and conflict management. Its "rules over power" mantra is not merely rhetorical; it reflects a deep-seated concern that unchecked unilateral actions could undermine regional peace and stability, impacting not only the directly involved claimants but also the broader ASEAN community and its economic interests. Jakarta’s consistent stance provides a moral and legal anchor for other ASEAN members, particularly those that may feel pressured by larger powers.

The Philippines’ Pivotal Role as ASEAN Chair

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in the Philippines, where Minister Sugiono made his statement, provided a particularly salient backdrop for the call for CoC finalization. As the current or recent Chair of ASEAN, the Philippines has a vested interest and a unique platform to push this agenda forward. Manila is arguably the ASEAN claimant state most frequently embroiled in direct confrontations with China’s coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea. Incidents around features like Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal have become regular occurrences, highlighting the urgent need for a mechanism to prevent miscalculations and manage disputes.

For the Philippines, the finalization of a robust CoC is not merely a diplomatic aspiration but a pressing national security and economic imperative. Its fishermen are routinely harassed, its resupply missions to remote outposts are challenged, and its sovereign rights within its EEZ are frequently encroached upon. Therefore, Manila has consistently made the acceleration and conclusion of CoC negotiations a top priority during its chairmanship, seeking to leverage its leadership role to galvanize regional efforts. The support from key partners like Indonesia is crucial for the Philippines to maintain momentum and present a united ASEAN front in negotiations with China.

Regional and Global Stakeholder Perspectives

The push for a CoC involves a complex interplay of interests from various regional and global stakeholders.

• China: Beijing’s consistent public statements emphasize its commitment to working with ASEAN for a peaceful, stable, and prosperous South China Sea. However, its actions on the ground, including large-scale island building, militarization of features, and assertive coast guard operations, often contradict these assurances. China generally seeks a CoC that does not undermine its sovereignty claims, does not involve third-party dispute resolution, and does not restrict its ability to act in what it considers its territorial waters. It also often prefers bilateral negotiations over multilateral ones for resolving specific disputes.
• Other ASEAN Claimants (Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei): These nations share the Philippines’ and Indonesia’s desire for a stable, rules-based South China Sea. Vietnam, in particular, has had significant clashes with China over oil exploration and fishing rights. Malaysia and Brunei, while generally adopting a more understated diplomatic approach, also seek clarity and stability for their resource development and maritime security. All these nations recognize the importance of a unified ASEAN stance to counter the overwhelming power asymmetry with China.
• Non-Claimant ASEAN States (Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar): While not directly involved in territorial disputes, these nations are deeply affected by regional stability. Singapore, a major shipping hub, relies heavily on the unimpeded flow of trade through the South China Sea. Instability or conflict in the region would have severe economic repercussions for all ASEAN members. However, some non-claimants, particularly those with strong economic ties to China, may be more cautious in their approach to the CoC, prioritizing consensus with Beijing.
• Major Powers (United States, Japan, Australia, European Union): These external powers consistently emphasize the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, adherence to international law, and peaceful resolution of disputes. The United States, through its "freedom of navigation operations" (FONOPs), directly challenges what it perceives as excessive maritime claims. These powers generally support a robust, legally binding CoC that is consistent with UNCLOS and enhances regional stability, seeing it as a critical component of the broader Indo-Pacific security architecture.

Challenges, Prospects, and Geopolitical Implications

The path to a legally binding and effective CoC remains fraught with challenges. The primary obstacle is the fundamental divergence in interpretation of international law and national interests between China and several ASEAN claimant states. China’s insistence on its historical claims and its reluctance to subject its actions to external arbitration or robust enforcement mechanisms pose significant hurdles. The sheer number of parties involved and their varied interests also complicate consensus-building within ASEAN itself.

Despite these difficulties, the potential benefits of a successfully concluded CoC are substantial. A robust CoC could:

1. Prevent Escalation: By establishing clear rules of engagement, it could significantly reduce the risk of accidental clashes or miscalculations escalating into wider conflicts.
2. Enhance Predictability: It would provide a stable framework for maritime activities, offering greater certainty for commercial shipping, fishing, and resource exploration.
3. Build Confidence: Through agreed-upon measures and communication channels, it could foster greater trust and transparency among the parties.
4. Facilitate Cooperation: It could pave the way for joint initiatives in areas such as marine scientific research, environmental protection, and search and rescue operations, even in disputed areas.
5. Uphold International Law: A CoC firmly based on UNCLOS would reinforce the principle of a rules-based international order, vital for global maritime governance.

The geopolitical implications of the CoC’s success or failure are far-reaching. A strong CoC would bolster ASEAN’s centrality and its role as a key regional security architect, demonstrating its ability to manage complex regional challenges. Conversely, a continued stalemate or a weak, ineffective CoC could undermine ASEAN’s credibility, exacerbate regional tensions, and potentially draw in external powers more directly, further complicating the security landscape. The ongoing great power competition between the United States and China also casts a long shadow over the negotiations, with both superpowers keenly observing the outcomes and their implications for regional influence.

Looking Ahead: The Path to Resolution

Foreign Minister Sugiono’s urgent call reflects a widely shared sentiment across Southeast Asia: the status quo in the South China Sea is unsustainable. The "24 years" of waiting since the DoC have demonstrated that aspirational declarations are insufficient to manage the complexities and inherent risks of overlapping claims and escalating incidents. The push for a CoC that prioritizes "rules over power" is not merely an ideological stance but a pragmatic necessity for regional stability and prosperity.

The coming months will be critical for the CoC negotiations. With the continued advocacy from nations like Indonesia and the determined leadership of the ASEAN Chair, there remains hope for progress. However, achieving an "effective and substantive" CoC that genuinely contributes to peace and stability will require genuine political will, flexibility, and a commitment from all parties, particularly China, to uphold international law and prioritize long-term regional stability over narrow nationalistic ambitions. The international community will be closely watching whether the South China Sea can finally transition from a flashpoint of contention to a zone governed by mutually agreed-upon rules.