The 1997–1998 monetary crisis remains one of the darkest chapters in modern Indonesian economic history. A severe financial tempest struck the archipelago, causing the national currency, the rupiah, to plummet violently. From a historically stable baseline of around Rp2,000 per United States Dollar, the currency crashed past the Rp10,000 mark before hitting an unprecedented and devastating low of roughly Rp16,000 per USD. This massive depreciation destroyed corporate balance sheets, triggered nationwide mass layoffs, and decimated consumer purchasing power. Amid the mounting panic and the looming threat of national bankruptcy, a unique moral and nationalist campaign emerged. Elite figures, political heavyweights, corporate titans, and everyday citizens united in a desperate push to promote the Garuda currency and reduce the nation’s systemic dependence on the greenback. Among the most sensational and widely publicized initiatives of this era was the "Gerakan Cinta Rupiah" (Love the Rupiah Movement), or Getar, spearheaded by Siti Hardijanti Rukmana—popularly known as Mbak Tutut, the eldest daughter of then-President Suharto.
The Anatomy of a Regional Contagion
To understand the desperation that birthed the Getar movement, one must examine the macroeconomic conditions of Southeast Asia in the late 1990s. According to historical analyses by scholars such as Jan Luiten van Zanden in his seminal work Ekonomi Indonesia 1800-2010 (2012), Indonesia’s currency collapse did not occur in a vacuum. The contagion originated from the mid-1997 depreciation and subsequent floating of the Thai baht. As foreign investors panicked, capital flight swept rapidly across Southeast Asia, overwhelming regional financial systems.
Indonesia entered this period burdened by significant private sector foreign debt denominated in US dollars. When the rupiah began to slide, Indonesian corporations rushed to buy dollars to service their overseas liabilities, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of rapid currency devaluation. Bank Indonesia, the central bank, fought a losing battle to defend the exchange rate, burning through foreign exchange reserves at an unsustainable pace. By early 1998, traditional monetary policy instruments had failed to stabilize the market, opening the door for unconventional, society-wide interventions driven by appeals to patriotism.
The Launch of Getar: Symbolism Meets the Exchange Counter
In January 1998, seeking to restore market confidence and bolster the central bank’s rapidly depleting foreign reserves, Mbak Tutut launched the Gerakan Cinta Rupiah. The core mandate of the movement was straightforward: encourage Indonesian citizens holding US dollar savings to convert their foreign exchange back into rupiah, thereby strengthening the local currency’s muscle and projecting national solidarity.
Contemporary media coverage captured the electric atmosphere surrounding the initiative. As the Bali Post reported on January 16, 1998, "The Love the Rupiah Movement (Getar) pioneered by Mrs. Siti Hardianti Rukmana, or Mbak Tutut, truly caused a tremor."
To lead by example, Mbak Tutut personally marched to a currency exchange point and converted $50,000 of her private funds into rupiah. This move was framed not merely as a technical fiscal maneuver, but as an act of high patriotism. She later supplemented this initial conversion by donating two kilograms of pure private gold bullion directly to the state, inspiring others to follow suit.
The Elite Mobilization: Politicians, Military Brass, and Tycoons Join the Ranks
Mbak Tutut’s high-profile action quickly created a cascading effect among the political elite and the military establishment. Archival reports from the Bali Post dated January 13, 1998, document a dramatic scene at the Bank Indonesia building, where a delegation of members from the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) arrived en masse to convert their dollar holdings into rupiah.
Among the prominent figures in this delegation was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), then a high-ranking military officer serving as an MPR member from the ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) faction, who would decades later become Indonesia’s sixth president. Historical records show that SBY converted $1,300 during the group visit, standing alongside other key parliamentary figures such as Ad Hoc Committee Chairman Hartono.
Economic technocrats and cabinet ministers also participated. Minister of Finance Mar’ie Muhammad and Bank Indonesia Governor Soedradjad Djiwandono contributed to the stabilization effort by liquidating their foreign exchange holdings. Cumulatively, this first wave of elite conversion injected roughly $650,000 in fresh foreign exchange into the central bank.
The movement also drew participation from Indonesia’s wealthiest business leaders. According to reports from the daily newspaper Berita Yudha on January 13, 1998, prominent tycoons such as Aburizal Bakrie, The Ning King, and Imam Taufik each converted $100,000 into rupiah, establishing themselves as the largest individual contributors of the campaign.
Veteran industrialist Sukamdani Sahid Gitosardjono followed closely behind. Berita Yudha noted, "Ranking second is businessman Sukamdani Sahid Gitosardjono, who released $50,000 and surrendered 1 kg of his personal gold to the government."
Economic Realities Versus Moral Appeals
Despite extensive media coverage and enthusiastic participation from the political and business elite, the Getar movement faced immediate skepticism from independent economists, financial analysts, and certain pragmatic politicians. Critics argued that moral suasion and patriotic symbolism were fundamentally powerless against the harsh realities of global market forces and overwhelming macroeconomic imbalances.
Financial assessments at the time estimated that the total foreign exchange mobilized through the Getar campaign amounted to roughly $5 million. In the grand scheme of Indonesia’s macroeconomic crisis, this sum was negligible. It represented a mere drop in the bucket compared to the billions of dollars needed to stabilize the currency market and service the country’s soaring private and public foreign debt obligations, which had ballooned to tens of billions of dollars.
Prominent businessman and politician Fahmi Idris voiced these concerns publicly, stating in the Bali Post on February 1, 1998, that the campaign "will not solve the problem."
Subsequent economic events validated these warnings. The structural weaknesses of Indonesia’s banking sector, combined with political uncertainty, ensured that the US dollar maintained its upward trajectory. The rupiah continued its steep decline, pushing import costs to unbearable levels and triggering widespread corporate bankruptcies, hyperinflation, and a severe shortage of essential goods, including basic foodstuffs (sembako).
From Financial Collapse to Political Revolution
The failure of monetary defenses and moral campaigns to halt the economic collapse accelerated a broader societal transformation. The severe financial shock quickly mutated into an acute socio-political crisis. As basic living standards collapsed, frustration boiled over into the public sphere.
By the spring of 1998, massive student-led demonstrations engulfed major cities across the archipelago. Protesters demanded sweeping political reforms, an end to corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN), and the resignation of President Suharto. The situation culminated in the turbulent May 1998 riots, which caused extensive property damage and loss of life, primarily in Jakarta and Surakarta.
Facing mounting pressure from his cabinet, parliament, and the public, President Suharto announced his resignation on May 21, 1998. This historic decision brought a definitive end to the New Order regime, which had governed Indonesia with an iron grip for 32 years.
Legacy and Historical Implications
Looking back across the decades, the Gerakan Cinta Rupiah serves as a fascinating case study in the intersection of nationalism, elite politics, and economic crisis management. While modern economists view campaigns like Getar as classic examples of ineffective "gimmickry" incapable of altering deep-seated structural and macroeconomic deficits, the movement remains a potent historical symbol. It highlights how political elites and citizens attempt to mobilize cultural and nationalistic identity when formal financial institutions falter. Ultimately, the 1998 crisis and the response to the falling rupiah demonstrated that while patriotism can inspire collective action, sustainable economic stability requires sound monetary policy, institutional transparency, and robust structural reform rather than symbolic currency conversions.
